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BABY M.: THE CONTRACTUAL LEGITIMATION OF MISOGYNY*
RICHARD F. DEVLIN**
"There are only women who are fruitful and
women who are barren, that's the Jaw"1

Introduction

The emergence of what have become known as the "new
reproductive technologies"2 is a phenomenon which is neither essen
tially good nor essentially bad. On the one hand, such developments
provide opportunities for social choice, family planning and procreative
autonomy which, until recently, were i�possible. This expansion of
horizons is clearly a "good". However, on the darker side, as a com
munity, we must be concerned about the directions which such oppor
tunities might take. There are very real dangers involved, including
excessive genetic engineering, raised expectations of perfect "products"
with the correlative dissatisfaction with the "imperfect", inequality of
access to these new avenues of reproduction and, most importantly,
the exploitation and instrumentalization of other human beings in this
process.3
It is inevitable that Jaw, as a constitutive element of social
interaction,4 will become embroiled in the value choices that we, as a
society, must make. Consequently, lawmakers, and in particular

0
This paper is dedicated to my sister-in-law, Sonia, and my niece, Emma, whose
preference for, and experience of, a less patriarchal context for childbirth first sen
sitized me to the sexual politics of reproduction. I would like to express my gratitude
to friends and colleagues at Dalhousie, in particular, Vaughan Black, Christine Boyle,
Cynthia Cavett, Joan Dawkins, Alastair Bissett-Johnson and Susannah Worth Rowley,
for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Particular thanks to Lynn
Richards and Marilee Matheson. The paper would never have been completed with
out the criticism and encouragement of Alexandra Z. Dobrowolsky.
.. Richard F. Devlin, LLB., LL.M., is an assistant professor of law at Dalhousie
University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
1Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale (1985), p. 71.
21n one sense some of these so-called innovations are not so new at all. For ex
ample, at least as far back as biblical times there were arrangements for one woman
to be impregnated by a man, who would on birth claim the child for his family,
thereby negating the &irth mother's maternal interests.
3For an excellent collection of feminist reflections on these issues, see (1986), 1
C.J.W.L., No. 2.
4see Devlin, "Tales of Centaurs and Men, A Preliminary Theoretical Inquiry into
the Nature and Relations of Law, State and Violence" (1987), Osgoode Hall L.J.
(forthcoming).
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legislatures5 and judges, must come to terms with the larger social
economic, political and moral issues which the advent of biotechnol
ogy creates.6 Lawmakers must transcend any myopic legalistic grid to
which they might still furtively cling, and seek to fulfil their civic
responsibility for others by making the most contextual and open
decisions they can. They must candidly admit the difficulties of their
task, the inadequacy of traditional legal7 and social frameworks, and
proceed honestly to articulate their best interpretation and resolution
of the problems with which they must deal. Although they will not be
guaranteed the achievement of "right answers",8 they will at least
have commenced a discourse that can allow for a democratic and
participatory plurality of arguments on the merits of their decision.

• I
I

I

i

5For a samplin of pre-legislative research, reports and co�ittees, see Re�rt of
g
the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (1984) (United
Kingdom) (hereinafter "Warnock Report"); Ethics Advisory Bd. of the Dept. of
Health, Education and Welfare, Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of Research
lnvolvin_g Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, (U.S.) 44 Fed. Reg.
35,034 (1979); Human Embryo Transfer, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investiga
tions and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, (U.S.) 98th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984); Council for Science and Society, Human Procreation: Ethical
Aspects of the New Techniques (U.S.) (1984); Ontario Law Reform Comm., Report
on Human Artificial Reprocluction and Related Matters (1985) (hereinafter "Ont.
L.R.C."). In Victoria, Australia, the Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical and
Legal :fssues Arising from In Vitro Fertilization (the "Waller Committee") has com
missioned several reports. See Bravender-Coyle, 'Medical Experiments and the Law
(1985), 59 Law Inst. J. 63.
6nie dominant response in Britain to the new reproductive technologies has been
couched in a moralistic discourse, primarily espousing traditional family values. See
for example, Baroness Warnock, "The Enforcement of Morals in the Light of New
Developments in Embryology" (1986), Current Legal Problems 17; and M.D.A.
Freeman, "After Warnock - Whither the Law?" (1986), Current Legal Problems 33.
Many American commentators work within the same framework. See, for example,
Thomas A. Eaton, "Comparative Responses to Surrogate Motherhood" (1986), 65
Nebraska LR. 686 at 687. A much wider understanding is required, one that under
stands the power relations which impact upon and determine the future direction of
such technologies. It is not just a moral issue.
7For useful discussions of the lag between law and reproductive technologies, see
for example, Keane, "Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood" (1980), S. ID. U.L.J.
147; Black, "Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood" (1981), 16 New Eng. L. Rev.
373; K.M. Sly, "Baby Sitting Consideration: Surrogate Mother's Right to 'Rent Her
Womb' For a Fee" (1982-83), 18 Gonzaga L.R. 539; Mawdsley, "Surrogate Paren
thood: A Need for Legislative Direction" (1983), 71 ID. BJ. 412; Note, "Surrogate
Mothers: The Legal Issues" (1981), 7 Am. J.L & Med. 323; Comment, "Contracts To
Bear a Child" (1978), 66 Calif. L. Rev. 611; Comment, "Parenthood by Proxy: Legal
Implications of Surrogate Birth" (1982), 67 Iowa L. Rev. 385; Comment, "Surrogate
Motherhood in California: Legislative Proposals" (1981), 18 San Diego L. Rev. 341;
Comment, "Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical
Notion" (19�2), 16 U. Rich. L R�. 467; Andre� Stumpf, "Redefining Mother: A
Legal Matrix for New Reproducuve Technologies" (1986), 96 Yale LJ. 187;
J. Mandler, "Developing a Concept of the Modem Family" (1985), 73 Georgetown
L.R. 1283; Avi Katz, "Surrosate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws" (1986), 20
Columbia J. of Law and Social Problems 1.
8Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978).
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At first blush, it may appears somewhat odd for a comment on
a lower level American case to appear in a Canadian publication.
However, if my opening comments are appropriate, then in view of
the similarities of the issues raised and the legal systems within which
we exist,9 such a comment is manifestly appropriate. Indeed, it may
even be essential so that we can evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of our southern predecessors when we are confronted with
similar problems. More pointedly, we should be particularly concerned
about the errors which they have made.
It is in this light that I wish to suggest that the decision of
Sorkow J. in Baby M., 525 A. 2d 1128, 13 Fam. LR. (U.S.) 22, 2201,
(NJ.S.C., 1987), is riddled with problems that we in Canada should
be loath to repeat. First, I argue that in respect to the question of
fact - what are the best interests of the child - the judge over
relied upon the testimony of the expert witnesses, thereby ignoring
the interests of the mother. Consequently, this element of his decision
manifests an unreflective and biased masculinist perspective on what
are the best interests of the child. Second, by interning bis analysis of
the legal questions in the prison-house of traditional contractual
analysis, he fails to respond to the larger social, economic and politi
cal issues raised by reproductive instrumentalism. When these two
aspects are tied together, unpacked and deconstructed to reveal both
their propositions and their silences we end up with a coherent state
ment of the invisible hand of free market misogyny masquerading as
the simple application of the rules of law existing in 1987 in the state
of New Jersey.
Before proceeding further, an issue of vocabulary needs to be
clarified. Traditionally, the debate around contracts for babies has
been overdetermined by the concept of surrogacy, more specifically,
"surrogate motherhood". Such a characterization is objectionable in
that it enforces and perpetuates an androcentric disinformation cam
paign as to what is actual)y occurring in these situations. The woman
who carries and gives birth to the child is not a surrogate, she is not
replacing anyone else, she is the mother. To state the issue differently
is to misrepresent and devalue the nature of mother/child relation
ships. The male who donates his sperm is the father, and that male's
spouse or partner is the social parent, the adopting parent. For those
with a legalistic inclination, "surrogacy" contradicts the maxim: mater
9
My discussion is primarily directed towards common law Canada, rather than
Quebec, whose Civil Code is somewhat divergent from that of the rest of Canada.
For a thorough discussion of the Quebec context, see Joan Bercovitch, "Civil Law
Regulation of Reproductive Technologies" (1986), 1 CJ.W.L 385.
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semper certa est. Language is a ma11eable instrument which carries
with it heavily loaded ideological messages. In this paper, "mother" is
the birth mother, "father" is the sperm donor, and "social parent" is
the spouse or partner of the sperm donor.10
The structure of this paper is straightforward. First, I wi11 briefly
outline the facts of the case. Second, I will look at the question of
fact and suggest that "neutrality" and "expertise", when critically
evaluated, may be no more than the ar:ticulation of a male bias in
advancing a solution to the complex issue of who should have custody
of Baby M. Third, I will discuss the legal issues both raised and
avoided and demonstrate their inherent malleability, thereby identify
ing Sorkow J.'s gender bias.
Facts
The facts of the case are well known and require little reitera
tion. In February 1986, Mr. Stem, a middle-class scientist, entered
into a contract with a financially beleaguered Mrs. Whitehead and her
husband. The contract provided that Mrs. Whitehead would attempt
conception through artificial insemination by Mr. Stem's sperm, carry
the foetus to term, then surrender the child to Mr. Stem and
"terminate" (at p. 1134) her parental rights. In return, she was to be
paid $10,000 and all medical expenses. Upon the birth of Baby M.,
Mrs. Whitehead indicated (at p. 1144) she "could not and would not
give up the child", but eventually surrendered her for one night. The
following day, she demanded return of the child and after a few
weeks confirmed her decision to retain custody. After a wrangling
process, in the course of which the Stems obtained a court order
granting them temporary custody, Mrs. Whitehead and her family il
legally left the state with the child.
After three months of fugitive existence, the Sterns' private
detective located Mrs. Whitehead in a hospital in Florida. The child
was removed from the Whitehead family and transferred to the
Stems. Custody proceedings ensued and Mr. Stern filed a complaint
seeking enforcement of the contract. The Honourable Harvey
R. Sorkow PJ.F.P. held that there was a valid enforceable contract,
that damages were inappropriate, and that specific performance was
required. Mrs. Whitehead was entitled to her fee and her parental
rights were terminated.
lOsee also S. Brodribb, "Off the Pedestal, onto the Block" (1986), 1 C.J.W.L. 408,
note 6; George J. Annas, "The Baby Broker Boom" (1986), Hastings Centre Report
(June) 30, p. 31.
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The Question of Fact
The first sentence of this decision says a great deal more than it
was probably intended to do. Sorkow J. states (at p. 1132):
The primary issue to be determined by this litigation is what are the
best interests of a child until now called "Baby M." All other concerns
raised by counsel constitute commentary.

This clear statement determines in advance what the result is going
to be.11 If priority is to be given -to the "best interests of the child"
without further ado, then in view of the obvious economic and social
inequality that exists between the two competing parties, barring some
extenuating circumstances, the "choice" will undoubtedly favour the
most advantaged, in this case, the Stems. Put simply, due to the so
cial and economic advantages of the Stems it is extremely unlikely
that the Whiteheads will gain custody of the child. This renders the
rest of the decision a rationalization of what was an inevitable and
foregone conclusion. Furthermore, by imposing this unidimensional
framework of analysis upon the case, Sorkow J. ignores another
equally important phenomenon, the reproductive interests of women.
By conceptualizing and structuring the issues within a mutually ex
clusive either/or framework,12 Sorkow J. obliterates in one quick
swoop some of the most problematic concerns raised by the case.
Sorkow J. is, of course, fully conscious of the highly volatile
political issues which the case encompasses. But rather than explicitly
accept the political responsibilities of the judicial role, he seeks refuge
in rhetorical and depersonalizing subterfuge. At an early point in the
decision (at p. 1138) he states that:
. . . this court . . . will decide on legal principles alone. This court must
not manage morality or temper theology. Its charge is to examine what
law there is and apply it to the facts proven in this cause.

11Tois claim is put forward from my position as one who knows very little about
family law. Of course, if one has a background in this area, a legally constructed per
ception, the greyness may well be more real. At the same time, however, ignorance
allows the outsider to see the wood in spite of the trees.
12Charlotte Bunch, "Beyond Either/Or: Feminist Options" (1976), 3 Quest 3.
Sorkow J.'s adversarial premises are manifest right from the beginning of his decision
(at p. 1132):
"There can be no solution satisfactory to all in this kind of case. Justice, our
desired objective, to the child and the mother, to the child and the father, cannot be
obtained for both parents. The court will seek to achieve justice for the child . .
"Where courts are forced to choose between a parent's rights and a child's welfare,
the choice is and must be the child's welfare and best interest by virtue of the
court's responsibility as parens patriae."
One wonders, however, whether such antagonistic "principles" are suitable or even
necessary for the resolution of social problems which are primarily about interconnec
tion, not conflict.
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This flight into a formalist perspective on law, in which the
court's only responsibility is to discover the relevant rules and apply
them to the facts of the case, is no more than an obfuscation of the
difficult social, economic and political choices that must be made. 13
There is a plurality of legal rules, principles and policies, and a judge
chooses from those options in order to "fit" what he or she has al
ready determined to be the most appropriate result in a case.
Moreover, in this particular case, as we shall see, Sorkow J. utilizes
certain "factual" evidence in order to further support and legitimize
his own predispositions. Both law and fact are valuable plastic instru
ments to rationalize . a value choice that exists independent of, and
prior to, the rules which are said to apply.
Having set this acontextual scene, without any evident sense of
contradiction, Sorkow J. immediately proceeds to outline the parties'
social, political and economic context. He paints an extremely rosy
picture of the Stem relationship. They manifest all the virtues of
middle-class America: affluence, professionalism, rationality, education,
industry, privacy, stability, sincerity, honesty, popularity and fidelity to
law. Mr. Stem is an immigrant survivor of the holocaust who has
worked his way up the totem pole of American meritocracy, a
paragon of virtue. Similarly, Mrs. Stem is portrayed as an ambitious
woman who is extremely career minded and who has achieved a
great deal in her life - for a woman.
The description of the Whiteheads is glaringly less sanguine. We
are told that Mrs. Whitehead left school at an early age, worked part
time in a pizza/deli shop, and married when she was only 16. Mr.
Whitehead, who is substantially older than his wife, is a Vietnam
veteran with an alcohol problem. The Whiteheads have been transient
throughout the years of their marriage and at one point they
separated. Moreover, they have bad a bankruptcy and financial
problems appear to continue. Thus, it is clear even at this early stage
that the social and economic status of the parties is going to be a vi
tal component in determining the best interests of the child. This ad
vantage is further consolidated when the court evaluates the character
and personalities of the two sides.
In order to determine which personality qualities are conducive
to the best interests of the child, the parties called on 11 expert wit131t is worthwhile noting that the only non-legal reference which Sorkow J. makes
at this point is to religious considerations. The affirmative denial of such a perspec
tive is one thing; the complete disregard of social, economic and political forces is
another. Even to rajse them would come too cJ05e to challenging judicial pretentions
to neutrality.
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nesses. Most of them were psychiatrists. In theory, the function of
such witnesses is to test the appropriateness and mental stability of
the competing parties. In practice, however, what occurs is that, in
addition to the social and economic attack, we encounter a psychiatric
and psychological challenge to the personalities of Mrs. Whitehead
and, to a lesser extent, her husband.14 Mrs. Whitehead is poorly edu
cated and irrational; impulsive and irresponsible; self-centered, posses
sive and intolerant; domineering and controlling; exploitative, ruthless
and conniving. She sees herself as victim and, at the same time, pos
sesses an exaggerated sense of aggr�ndizement and self-importance.
She is a poor wife because she refuses to succour her husband and
his alcohol problem. In a word, she is psychopathological (at pp.
1150-56). Not once did any of these experts (or the judge) refer to
her sacrifice of her own health and ultimate hospitalization for a mas
sive gynecological infection which was induced, in large part, by her
fugitive efforts to remain with her child.

14 A fairly lengthy aside is appropriate at this point. In one sense it is important
to note that these are not the court's witnesses, they are called by the parties, they
are another manifestation of the adversarial process. The Stems called only two ex
pert witnesses, Drs. L Salle and A. Levine, while the Whiteheads called six: Drs.
H. Koplewitz, P. Silverman, S. Nickman, B. Sokoloff, J. Velter and B. Klein. The
other three experts were called by the guardian ad Jitem: Drs. M. Schecter,
D. Brodzinsky and J. Grief.
In theory, through the adversarial joust of expert witnesses the "truth" about the
best interests of the child will emerge. However, the judicial commentary on the
evidence, credibility and authority of the witnesses is revealing. Sorkow J. dismisses
the evidence of several of the Whiteheads' experts as being irrelevant, unworkable, in
adequate or biased. Particularly interesting is his critique (at p. 1148) of the bias of
Dr. Phyllis Silverman, "She began with a stated bias against men and questioned
whether male and even female mental health professionals can properly evaluate
women". Decoded, because she subscribed to the "F-word", feminism, her evidence is
worthless. Moreover, it is irrelevant insofar as it addresses the psychology of Mrs.
Whitehead and the impact upon her of the loss of her child. But Sorkow J. does not
want to know about "the adult", only the child. One could hardly find a better ex
ample of t.he ostrich theory of judicial decision-making.
Just as revealing is Sorkow J.'s response to the most vindictive expert assault on
Mrs. Whitehead, that of Dr. Schecter. Sorkow J. begins (at p. 1150): "In view of the
decidedly minority view of Dr. Schecter's findings of mixed personality disorder, the
court will give no weight to his diagnostic conclusion." (emphasis added) He then
proceeds to reiterate in graphic detail the report, thus subtly mfluencing the minds of
the audience by silencing one opinion and further legitimizing Sorkow J.'s own
preference. The more wide-ranging concern about the use of expert witnesses occurs
m the text.
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It is at this point that we must begin to question the basic
presuppositions of these expert witnesses. We cannot simply assume
that expertise equals neutrality or objectivity. In a variety of dis
ciplines and discourses from literature to philosophy, politics to
science, a fundamental reassessment of the "taken for fsanteds" that
structure conventional wisdom is already well under way. 5 This recon
sideration posits that there is an integral connection between gender
and knowledge, that the world as we know it is premised on a
primarily masculinist episteme and that, as a consequence, there has
been a silencing of the different voices from female perspectives. If
we accept the validity of this re-evaluation, then, as a direct con
sequence, it is no longer viable for us to concur in professionals'
traditional pretensions to objectivity and expertise; "experts" are
politically and epistemologica11y partisan.
One of the most celebrated and inspirational examples of this
reconsideration is the work of psychosociologist Carol Gilligan, who
criticizes Lawrence Kohlberg's highly influential theory of moral
development which eulogizes individualism, rationality, abstraction and
autonomy as the "highest level of moral stature".16 Gilligan's response
is that such an "ethic of separation" is built upon a male perspective
which fails to fit with or, perhaps more importantly, tolerate female
experiences of emotional attachment, contextualism and interdepen
dence ("an ethic of care"). These alternative visions can be captured
in the metaphors of "the ladder" and "the web", respectively.17
If we interpret the present case in the light of these competing
visions, it becomes uncomfortably obvious that almost all of the ex
pert witnesses fall within the characteristic of "ladder", in their praise
of independence, autonomy, liberty and separation, as against the
"web" of interdependence and the ethic of care. Thus, there do in
fact exist at least two competing interpretations of what "the best in
terests of the child" might mean. However, in this case, the dominant
15see for example, Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science 1985 ;
(
)
A. Miles and G. Finn, Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics (1982);
E. Marks and I. deCourtivron, New French Feminisms (1980); Harding and Hintikka,
Discovering Reality (1983).
16Kohlberg has produced a great deal of work espousing this theoxy. The most
useful sources are his Essays in Moral Development: Vol. 1 - The Philosophy of
Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Ideal of Justice (1981); Vol. 2 - The
Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages (1986).
17Again Gilligan's arguments span a variety of papers. But see in particular, In a
Different Voice: Psychological Theo!.}'. and Women's Development (1982). For a fuller
bibliography see Joan C. Toronto, "Heyond Gender Difference To a Theory of Care"
(1987}, 12 S!sns 644, note 1. It is extremely important to point out that the text is a
crude simplification of what is an extremely subtle argument by Gilligan and her col
leagues, but the "synopsis" is adequate for the limited purposes of this comment
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paradigm is accepted without question as being the only legitimate
criterion for determination. This, of course, should not come as a
surprise, as difference is frequently identified as deviant.
After concluding with an extremely lengthy review of the
evidence of the mental health professionals, the judge goes on (at p.
1156) to emphasize "that expert testimony is adduced only to aid the
trier of fact in reaching a decision". Within five lines, he again says
the purpose of expert testimony is to aid the trier of fact to under
stand the evidence. In the next pa_ragraph he adds:
This court notes that the testimony of experts desexves respect Their
testimony must, however, be submitted to the judgment and consideration
of, and be weighed by, the trier of fact. &perts are to aid and assist the
trier of fact, not to dominate or control him in the decision of the dis
puted question.

These are important statements but surely the reader must be con
cerned about the repetitiveness of these affirmations. The judge is in
sisting (at p. 1156) that he is not going to "slavishly parrot" the
analysis provided by the experts and reinforces this three times in a
very short space. We think he doth protest too much. Our suspicions
are confirmed when the judge subsequently comes to give his final
determination and reiterates, almost verbatim, the assessment and
analysis espoused by the expert witnesses.
What we have happening here is a denial of the normative
aspect of law. What we have is a process through which experts be
come final adjudicators. Put differently, scientism replaces nor
mativism. This would not be problematic except that "scientific
judgment" is based on as many unquestioned assumptions and
paradigm biases as is any normative argument. 18 The turn to scien
tism can obscure rather than articulate the basic premises . upon which
a decision is made. In relation to the present case, we can identify a
blurring of the lines between the descriptive and the normative. What
"is" becomes what "ought" to be, and those who do not fulfil these
masculinist criteria are perceived as deviant, unworthy of a parenting
role. Decoded, those who do not fulfil the androcentric criteria are
not competent to fulfil the best interests of the child. The noble
dream of liberal realism, that the introduction of scientific information
would make decision-making more likely to reach a just conclusion,
has become a nightmare for contemporary disadvantaged groups. Not
only must they make a persuasive normative argument, they must

8.r.

1
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (1970); P. Feyerabend,
Against Method (1975).
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also take on the heavy artillery of authoritarian expertise, an exhaust
ing, expensive and arduous process.
So, when Sorkow J. comes to give a decision on "the facts", as
the objective neutral trier of facts, we are not surprised to hear a
rationalization of his economic, social and gender bias. To set the
scene, his first claim is that we know the Stems desperately wanted a
child. This is undoubtedly the case, but we must also remember that
they wanted · a child at their own instrumental convenience, after they
had their careers established (p. 1139).19 Unfortunately, due to Mrs.
Stem's feared multiple sclerosis, it may have been dangerous for her
to undergo pregnancy. In part this was due to her age. Because of
her decision to pursue her career rather than maternity, the Stems
had put off having a child until she was 36. They had therefore
chosen to forego parenthood in order to pursue their economic and
intellectual desires. That is an initial choice and risk to which Sorkow
J. does not pay attention.
This leads to a subtle but vitally important point. In a broader
context, judicial endorsement of the contractual legitimacy of contracts
for babies may support and reinforce the traditional and hierarchical
division of labour which confines women to the "private sphere". Al
though, at first glance, contracts for babies may appear to increase
the options for women by providing a mechanism that will allow
them to first establish their careers and then "have a family in later
life", the option is only true is a limited sense. First, due to its ex
pensive nature, it is only available to middle or upper class women.
Second, it encapsulates a "divide and rule" technique by which
women's choice is restricted to either sacrificing their careers or
(ab)using other women to mother the children. Third, and intercon
nectedly, rather than confronting the primary problem of why any
woman should ever have to choose between motherhood and a career
instead of being able to do both, this perceived remedy glosses over
such concerns, thereby ultimately legitimizing the continued existence
of the division of labour, and the lack of choice.
Having duly acknowledged the parental aspirations of the Stems,
the judge shifts his discussion to an analysis of the Whitehead
relationship (at p. 1167), and delivers a diatribe that even goes
beyond the onslaught of the mental health professionals! He averts to
"separations" in the plural when we have been told they have had
19For concerns about the danger of this "convenience argllment", sec "Warnock
Report", ante, note 6, para. 8.17: see also Diana Brahams, Toe Lancet (28th July
1984) 238, p. 239.
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only one. He refers to domestic violence, which is surprising as this is
the first time that it is mentioned. Indeed, the evidence up to this
point suggests that there was no domestic violence and Mrs.
Whitehead even gave evidence that her husband was not an abusive
or violent drunk. This disconnection is reinforced because Sorkow
J. proceeds to add that Mrs. Whitehead dominates the family and
that Mr. Whitehead is clearly in the subordinate role.20 Perhaps the
implication is that Mrs. Whitehead is the source of the violence?
Mr. Whitehead is accused of being uninterested but, in fact, he
did go to Florida in support of his wife's desire to retain custody of
the child. Yet the court seems to simply ignore this fact out of exist
ence. Mrs. Whitehead is also accused of being impulsive. That is, the
"sins" of her youth, such as dropping out of school and marrying at
an early age, are being visited upon her now. There is a sinister
analogy with prior sexual history. Moreover, she is severely criticized
for "manipulative[ly]" and "narcissistical[ly)" bringing her older child
ren into court. However, une must question whether Mrs. Whitehead
was as conniving as Sorkow J. suggests or whether the responsibility
really lies with her lawyer and/or the media.
There is more. Although Sorkow J. is forced to admit that there
is strong evidence that she is a good mother, he protests that Mrs.
Whitehead exhibits an "emotional over-investment". He adds that (at
p. 1168):
. . . Mrs. Whitehead loved her children too much. This is not necessarily
a strength. Too much love can smother a child's independence. Even an
infant needs her own space.

Such a claim speaks volumes. Sorkow J. rejects love as being an or
ganizing principle of human interaction. Rather he demands indepen
dence and autonomy, a classic statement of liberalism's preference for
"rugged individualism" and "anxious privitism",21 the ethic of separa
tion which stands in stark contradiction to the gynocentric, Gil
liganesque ap�roach which favours interdependence, empathy, solid
arity and love. 2

20Both explicitly and implicitly we can sense the judge being upset at the gauche
ness of this strong-willed woman. She has transgressed the traditional roles of
male/female, domination/subordination; she is the strong party and, for her arrogance,
she is perceived as being an unworthy woman to rear a child.
21Peter Gabel, Book Review, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), 91 Harvard LR. 302.
22Ante, footnote 17. See also Roberto M. Unger, Law in Modem Society (1976),
pp. 203-16; Passion, An Essay on Human Personality (1984); Politics (forthcoming,
1987) 3 vols.
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This denigration of Mrs. Whitehead continues in the discussion of
education. The judge praises the Sterns for having demonstrated the
strong role that education has played in their lives. However, Mrs.
Whitehead is piUoried for interfering in her son's education because
she rejected the recommendations of the professional child study
team. She is portrayed as a meddlesome mother who elevates her
concerns for her children over the objective assessment by the profes
sionals. Why could such concern not be interpreted positively, that she
is a serious mother who actively participates in the education and
growth of her children, rather than abandoning them to the dictates
of a sterile, professionalized - i.e., scientific, unemotional - evalua
tion? Moreover, this attack ignores one of the reasons which Mrs.
Whitehead gave for entering into an agreement with the Sterns in the
first place: to obtain sufficient money to allow for the education of
her other children (at p. 1142). In other words, she has demonstrated
a compelling interest in education, yet once again this is simply ig
nored by Sorkow J.
Moreover, Mrs. Whitehead is .accused of being incapable of
having rational judgment. In particular, Sorkow J. points out that she
left for Florida with the child and that this was poor judgment.
However, one questions whether this was as irrational as the court
suggests. It was obvious, as the decision subsequently confirms, that
there was absolutely no chance of Mrs. Whitehead being entitled to
retain custody of the child. She clearly foresaw this and decided to
take the only action available to her - she fled the state. In other
words, in view of her options, she acted extremely rationally.
However, Sorkow J. simply interpreted this as being irrational.
Rationality is clearly a malleable concept, especially when the person
alleging irrationality feels vulnerable for having his authority flouted.
For good measure, he takes up several paragraphs (at pp. 1169-70)
to persuade us that Mrs. Whitehead is a liar.
Finally, Sorkow J. plays his trump card by "demotherizing" her,
and caricaturing her as a "custodian". Even though she had a past
record of being a good mother, her existential status of being the
mother of this child is denied, "severe[d]" and "terminate[d]" (at pp.
1170-71 ), with the consequence that she becomes a reified, legalized
custodian. This is extremely insulting to a woman who has carried
and nourished another person within her for a period of nine months.
It demonstrates both an amazing insensitivity, indeed hostility, on the
part of Sorkow J., and the imposition of legal jargon upon what are
quintessentially human interrelationships.
On reflection, there is another side to the "best interests of the
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child" perspective, one which is suitably underacknowledged by Sorkow
J. Beyond the danger of genetic rootlessness, 23 it may not be in the
best psychological interests . of children to realize the history of their
creation, tha( they were ripped away from their natural mother
through the coercive apparatus of the state, that they were a com
modity, bartered on the free market economy just like a
thoroughbred horse - only much cheaper. It hardly inspires a high
level of self-worth or self-esteem to realize that it was the power of
the market that determined their history, their experiences, their
life.24 This may well be fertile ground for alienation. Sorkow J. is
conscious of this danger but reinterprets and defuses it to be an issue
of privacy; it is up to the "new family" to decide how to tell the
child. This is hardly an adequate response to what is supposed to be
the central determining factor in the case. Secondly, there is evidence
to suggest that a child rapidly forms psychological ties with the parent
who has custody.25 In this case it was Mrs. Whitehead who had
original - if "unlawful" - custody of the child for over four months;
it would have been in her best interests to stay with her mother.
Looked at in this light, principles such as the "best interests of the
child" may, in fact, only be a camouflage for the best interests of the
sperm donor.
Thus, in theory, there is supposedly a neutral, fact-finding
process. What we encounter, in practice, is the imposition of an
androcentric world view, in which the virtues of rationality, free choice
and autonomy are all eulogized and attributed to the Stems while
legitimate, competing values demonstrated by Mrs. Whitehead are un
acknowledged or minimized. By a manipulative blinkering of the
issues, Mr. Stem's "intense drive to procreate"26 is prioritized over
Mrs. Whitehead's gestational bonding. We experience a shocking use
of expert witnesses to destroy what should be a normative argument
and a process of judicial reasoning apparently motivated by hostility.
When we tum to questions of law, we shall see that Mrs. Whitehead
did not fare much better.

23Kass, "Making Babies - The New Biology and the Old Morality" (1972), 26
Pub. Interest; Kass, "Making Babies Revisited" (1979), 39 Pub. Interest 56.
248. Joe, Public Policies Toward Ado tion (1978), p. 18. There is also the reverse
side of the coin, that the child will feef pressured to live up to her or his price to
demonstrate that the purchasers got their money's worth.
251. Goldstein, A. Freud and A. Solnit., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
(1983), pp. 17-19.
26At p. 1158. This theme seives as a chorus in Sorkow J.'s paean to the justice of
exchange and rugged individualism: see also pp. 1136, 1139, 1156.
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The Question of Law
There are two angles which we can adopt in order to understand
Sorkow J.'s decision on the legal issues raised by this case. The first
is to analyse what he explicitly decided and on what basis. The
second is to delineate those aspects which he ignored, the counter
arguments, the gaps, the silences. By tying both of these approaches
together we can reach a fuller - and more critical - understanding
of Sorkow J.'s unarticulated presuppositions.
The very nature of the discourse adopted by Sorkow J. in this
case exemplifies how a social and political problem is reinterpreted,
encoded to be an abstract legal problem, decontextualizing the actors
and setting them up as unsituated equal bargainers in a mythical
economic environment. The legal rhetoric denies the politico-economic
reality and at the same time constructs a new, distorted and even
more oppressive reality.
Sorkow J. hammers the polymorphous social, political, economic
and ethical issues raised by Baby M, into the square hole of contrac
tual analysis. His initial proposition is that there was consideration:
"the male gave his sperm; the female gave her ep, in their pre
planned effort to create a child - thus, a contract".2 The balancing
act envisioned in this seemingly logical formula is deceptively simple,
and inaccurate. While it is true that Mr. Stem provided some of his
sperm, what Mrs. Whitehead contributed was a great deal more than
an egg. She gave a substantial portion of her life; she was in
capacitated for a certain amount of time; she went through all the
pleasures and fears of carrying a child to term; and, indeed, she may
well have risked her life insofar as childbearing, even in the 20th cen
tury, is by no means a safe endeavour. On the other hand, there was
very little risk in Mr. Stem giving some of his sperm.28 Therefore,
the parallel between the sperm and the egg is unacceptable.29
27At p. 1158. Again this is one of the shibboleths which Sorkow J. reiterates on
several occasions: see also pp. 1163, 1166.
28sorkow J. does suggest (p. 1143) that Mr. Stem undertook a risk because "in the
event the child possessed genetic or congenital abnormalities William Stem would as
sume legal responsibility for the child once it was born". One wonders about the na
ture and extent of this risk. The contract also provided that if it was discovered that
the foetus was abnormal Mr. Stem could have it aborted. Thus, the contract allowed
for Mr. Stem to have it both ways - a perfect child or an aborted foetus if it was
not up to standard. Of course, the court struck down the provi<lion for the abortion
on demand as being unconstitutional, but that does not significantly increase Mr.
Stem's risk, because he could automatically surrender the child for adoption on birth.
Again he could have the best of both wor1ds, if he wanted.
29see also G. Corea, The Mother Machine (1985), pp. 226-27.
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Nevertheless, it might be argued, the law will not assess the adequacy
of consideration30 - these were the terms which she accepted; if it
was a poor bargain it is still not appropriate for the courts to inter
vene. There have been cases in which the courts are willing to assess
the adequacy of consideration31 and, besides, the needs of an embryo
are qualitatively different from the value of a peppercorn.32 Even
within the dissatisfying framework of contractual analysis, the whole
idea of consideration is underdeveloped and underanalysed in this
case, ignoring completely the factor of gestation.
Sorkow J.'s discussion of consideration also allows us to identify
the rhetorical permutations which play a vitally important, legitimating
function in the decision. Consideration is the central component of
the exchange or bargain model of contract law, based as it is on a
laissez-faire philosophy of human interaction and state intervention.
In other words, a deal is a deal, and Sorkow J. was unable to rectify
the agreement or imply new terms on Mrs. Whitehead's behalf.
However, the exchange model bas never attained the position of un
rivalled jurisprudential hegemony, because it has been modified by a
justice-inspired, reliance model which seeks to protect those who,
depending upon another, have acted to their detriment. Reliance
theory allows for judicial intervention. It is in this light that we can
highlight the shift in the judicial rhetoric, for while Sorkow
J. continues to discuss Mrs. Whitehead in the framework of bargain
ing, he emphasizes the Sterns' naivete (at p. 1145) and reliance (at p.
1158) upon Mrs. Whitehead. Indeed, be even explicitly suggests (at p.
1160) that she is in "the dominant bargaining position".
This is further reinforced when Sorkow J. interprets Mrs. Stern's
multiple sclerosis as leaving the Sterns with no other option but to
rely on Mrs. Whitehead. Is this so? Mrs. Stem's multiple sclerosis was
mild and only remotely liable to exacerbation by pregnancy. Even the
post-partem risks were less than 50-50, between 5-40 per cent.
Sorkow J. was keen to take this evidence into consideration. Indeed,
30Bo/Jon v. Maddm (1873), LR. 9 Q.B. 55 at 56; Calwns v. Kara/off, [1947]
S.C.R. 110, J 1947) 1 D.LR. 734; Richard Posne!z_ :Economic An%is of Law, 3rd ed
(1986), pp. 5-88; G.H.L Fridman, The Law of u,ntract, 2d ed. 1986), pp. 81-82.
31
sec for example In re Greene, 45 F. 2d 428 (S.D.N.Y., 1930), and more generally,
Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (1986), c. 3 . See also Fuller, "Consideration and
Form" (1941), 41 Col. LR 799. More often than not, however, the courts prefer to
transfer the mue of adequacy of consideration to the issue of inequality of bargaining
power or unconscionability, thereby hopefully leaving intact the exchange paradigm of
contract law.
32
B?iitney v. Stems, 16 Me. 394 at 397 (1839), is the classic American statement of
the peppercorn theory of consideration.
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he accepted Mrs. Stern's belief that the risk was "great".33 But there
was a noticeable paucity of evidence as to whether her multiple
sclerosis would deteriorate independent of pregnancy, thereby reducing
her potential input with respect to the rearing of a child.34 Put
tersely, it may not be in the best interests of a child to run the risk
of having one parent disabled by multiple sclerosis, when there are
other parents available who do not have the same liability. These
statistics could have been matched, and the decision based, in part,
upon any such evaluation. At the very least, however, it is an over
statement to say (at p. 1167) that "surrogacy [was] the only viable
vehicle for them to have a family".
There was also the alternative of adoption. Although it may be
true that it is difficult to adopt a "desirable infant" in the United
States,35 it is relatively easy to adopt what are euphemistically called
"special needs children", those who are older, ethnic or handicapped.
Could it be that the Stems did not want to have one of these "less
than suitable" children as their own? The main point, however, is that
expectation rather than reliance is a more accurate description of the
relationship between the Stems and Mrs. Whitehead.
A third argument developed by Sorkow J. is that contract law
will not permit a person to withdraw from a contract simply because
she changes her mind. However, this is not like buying a car, or
changing one's mind halfway through a meal in a restaurant. On this
issue, Sorkow J. sets the discussion at a high level of abstraction in
that he fails or refuses to recognize the experiential dynamics of ges
tation. The research of scholars like Dorothy Dinnerstein and Nancy
Chodorow suggests that gestation involves a strong bonding process
which has a major impact on the psychosocial personality of a woman

33ms preference for Mrs. Stern's subjective belief stands in stark opposition to his
refusal to accept almost anything which Mrs. Whitehead said, and his claim that she
is a liar (see pp. 1169-70).
34rbe suggestion here is not that only Mrs. Stern rather than her husband should
fulfil the role of rearin� parent Rather, it suggests that all things being equal, the in
put of both parents JS desirable, not just one. Nor does the text advocate a
heterosexist preference; rather, it suggests that one relevant factor could be that two
parents may be more beneficial than one.
35see B. Joe, Public Policies Toward Adoption (1979). It is curious that one of the
authorities which Sorkow J. refers to (at p. 113'7) is entitled, "Adoption, It's Not
Impossible". Furthermore, when he discusses the reasons why adoption is becoming
increasingly difficult his references are primarily to women's chan�ing response to
procreation. Is this another version of blaming the victim? The �1bility of success
fully adopting a "desirable" child in Canada is also low: Ontario Law Reform Com
mission on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters (1985), vol. 1.
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when she is pregnant.36 The court simply ignores this by relying on
abstract ideas of contract law, such as, you cannot change your mind
after you have entered into a contract, "all sales are final".37 The
rejection of contextualism and the flight to formalism smacks of a
willful ignorance of these issues.
These concerns about Sorkow J.'s self-imposed myopia are rein
forced when we look beyond the narrow confines of contract doctrine.
Adoption law explicitly takes into account the factor that it is impos
sible for a woman to know beforehand what she would feel when the
child was born, whether she would love her or whether she could sur
render her. Most jurisdictions provide that there is to be a specified
time period within which a mother is presumed to be legally in
capable of providing valid consent to the adoption.38 Sorkow J. could
very easily have drawn on this analogy to imply a term into the con
tract that Mrs. Whitehead be allowed a "reconsideration" or
"confirmation" period in which to confirm her pre-gestational
decision.39 Thus, without necessarily falling into the danger of pater
nalistic protectionism, contract law could easily allow for gestational
bonding to be a qualification on consent, available to women who
elect to make use of it.
�ancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Motherhood: P5¥choanalysis and the
Sociology of Gender (1978); Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur
(197?). See also B. Blum (ed.), Psychological Aspects of Pregnancy, Birthing and
Bonding (1980); Katha Pollitt, "The Strange Case of Baby_ M", The Nation, (23rd
May 1987) 681 at 686; Adrienne Rich, Of Mother Born: Motherhood as Expenence
and Institution (1977); Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction (1981); Sara Rud
dick, "Maternal Thinking" (1980), 6 Feminist Studies 432. Indeed, one supporter of
such contracts inadvertently admits as much when she posits that "the surroiate may
need help in erecting [!l a psychological barrier so that she does not expenence the
child or her own . . .": Katz, ante, footnote 7, p. 21, footnote omitted.
Again we have an example of omission and silencing that reveals at least as much,
and probably more, than what is discussed in the judgmenL It is a fact that bonding
does take l'lace both pre- and post-partem, but this is not something which is dis
cussed or introduced as evidence, precisely because it would challenge the initial
predisposition of the judge. On the contrary, Sorkow J. is at pains to emphasize the
relationship built up between the Sterns and the child. Why are some facts important,
while others are not?
37Katha Pollitt, ibid, p. 681.
38see for example, Adoption Act (U.K.), 1976, c. 36, s. 8(4); Children's Services
Act, S.N.S. 1976, c. 8, s. ll,3j. Ariz. Rev. StaL Ann., para. 8-107 (1974); Ill. Ann.
StaL, c. 40, para. 1511 (Smith Hurd, 1980); Mass. Ann. 1.aws, c. 210, para. 2 (Michie)
Law Co-o 1981). Moreover, such an implied term would dovetail with the explicit
public
� underlying the New Jersey adoption Jaws: NJ. Stat. Ann., para.
9:3-17(b .
is section exp�ly posits that: "it is necessary and desirable . . . to
protect the natural parents from hurried or abrupt decisions to give up the child".
39See below for a discussion of Sorkow J.'s rejection of Adoption Law Analogies.
Britain's Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Ethics Committee specifi
cally objects to contracts for babies on this very issue: see Report of RC.O.G.
Report on In Vitro Fertilisation and Embryo Replacement or Transfer, para 7.3
(1983).
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Sorkow J. rejects such a proposition through recourse to a classic
example of abstraction, legal formalism and reductio ad absurdum.
He asks facetiously (at p. 1149):
Would [counsel) have all contracts remain in limbo until the result of the
intended agreement is available and the makers could then conclude
whether the result is what was intended and the contract then made en
forceable?

Such rhetoric seems to deliberately miss the point. What is involved
in this situation is an extremely specific type of contract dealing with
a particular social situation. Abstract x:ules and formalistic analogies
are inappropriate. What is essential is a sensitive, contextual, gender
conscious response which recognizes that there are factors which make
contracts such as these worthy of special treatment, and that different
criteria should be applied.
The issue of consent could also have been considered from the
perspective of unconscionability, inequality of bargaining power and
economic duress. Sorkow J. rejects such claims w.ith only the most su
perficial reflection. He suggests (at p. 1157) that contracts for babies
do not exploit women because the women who enter into such con
tracts do so freely; they are unlike unwed mothers who are pregnant,
isolated and vulnerable. Such a particularistic, atomized perspective
fails to consider the systemic poverty of American society, both on a
class and gender basis. It consciously ignores the whole economic con
text of the parties, something which Sorkow J. was extremely en
thused about in his decision on the factual aspect of the case.40 Not
even Sorkow J. could be immune to the now "taken for granted"
fact that women earn, at best, Jess than two thirds pf what men
eam.41 More specifically, reports indicate that the financial returns are
4
0see above, section entitled "The Question of Fact", pp. 8-16.
41sec for example, Five Thousand American Families - Patterns of Economic
Pro_gress (1974), p. 144; Smith, "The Movement of Women into the Labour Force" in
Smith (ed.) The -Subtle Revolution (1979); U.S. Comm'n on Civil Riahts, Comparable
Worth: An Analysis and Recommendations 13-17 (June 1985); 2 tJ.S. Comm'n On
Civil Rights, Comparable Worth: Issue for the Bl>'s, A Consultation of the U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Riahts, Proceedings June 6-7, 1984, at 1-47
984); Blumrosen,
Wage Discrimina�n, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the C;;ivil i
· hts _Act of 1�
abty, Sex Dif
(1979), 12 U. MJCh. J.L Ref. 399, p 4 2-15; Freedman, Sex
0 92 Yale LI. 913, pp. 913,
ferences, and the Supreme Court" �
1983),
1_5j Frog,
"Securing Job !!quality for Women:
r Market Hostility to Working Mothers"
(1979), 59 B.U.L Rev. 55, pp. 55-61; Jeffries and McGahey, "�ity, Growth and
Socioeconomic Change: Anti-Discrimination Policy in an Eia of Economic
Transformation" (1985), 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 233, pp. 256-58; B. Gelp�
N. Hartsock, C. Novak, M. Strober (eds.) Women and Poverty (1986); J. Dex.
L Shaw, British and American Women at Work (1986). For a valuable compilation
of statistics on women's poverty in Canada see Susannah Worth Rowley, "Women,
Pensions and Equality" in Charterwatch: Reflections on Equality (1986), p. 283.

22

REPORTS OF FAMILY LAW

10 R.F.L. (3d)

a vital motivationaJ factor for women entering into such contracts,42
and yet au they might receive is $10,000.43 Therefore, it was open
to Sorkow J. to widen his perspective, respond to his acute awareness
of the relative poverty of the Whiteheads, and introduce the factor of
economic duress44 to negate consent, and render the contract un
enforceable. Rather, he Jatched onto Mary Beth Whitehead's "desire
to give a gift to another childless family", converted altruism into a
self-sacrificing and painful obligation, and ignored the all too real
economic context of the agreement. An unwanted pregnancy is onJy
one of a plethora of factors ...:.. and perhaps not even the most im
portant - which may coerce women into contracts for babies. Resort
to such an argument is distraction, not responsible. decision-making.
At one point, Sorkow J. seeks to legitimize his decision, to prove
(at p. 1158) that he is not "antifeminist" by adjudicating that the
mother has the determinative power of deciding what to do with a
"child" while it is stiIJ in the gestation period. He suggests that up
until the point of birth the woman can aJways have an abortion, and
to support this proposition he draws on the doctrine of privacy as
outJined in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The benefits of such a
qualification may be more apparent than real. Roe v. Wade, although
it espouses the abstract constitutional principle that women have a
right to abortion, has been significantly undermined in a series of
42one study conducted in Michigan claimed that, although a substantial proportion
of potential mothers stated their r,rimary motivation was altruism, 89 per cent of
those interviewed said they would 'not do it withouJ �ing paid" (New York Times,
18th Januacy 1987). Parker claims that, "40% of surro_Bacy applicants were un
employed or on welfare" ((1983), 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 1 17). For a powerful account
of the reality of the surrogacy industry in the U.S., see S. Ince, "Inside the Surrogate
Industry" in R Arditti (cd.), Test-Tube Women (1984), pp. 99-116: but see Eaton,
ante, footnote 7, who disagrees.
43
At first blush, this may apI_>Car to be a substantial sum, but worked out on an
hourly basis over nine months 1t amounts to less than minimum wage. Furthermore,
even thi! is not accurate, for the process freQueotJy takes over a year because it
usually takes several months to conceive. Indeed, in this case it took six months and
nine mscminatioos for conception to occur. According to Katz, ante, footnote 7, cur
rent rates vacy in the SS,000-$25,000 range. Thi! is not the total sum of money to
change hands in such a transaction. There arc also legal fees which appear equal to
those paid to the mother, as well as medical and psychological fees. This reinforces
the claim that only the more affluent applicants have access to such a process. The
discussion of price paid is extremely difficult because we do not know what is goinf
on in this industry. Some &rg11e that prices are going up, and that this will "solve
the problem of exploitation. However, there are also indications that as the option
becomes more popular the market will expand and the "competition" will become
more difficult for birth mothers, thereby necessitating that they will drop their fees.
One recent case in San Diego reveals that a Mexican woman was paid only $1,500.
Sec Scott, "Pair Duped Her on Surrogate Mother Pact, Woman Tells Court", LA.
Times, 20th February 1987, para I, p. 22, col. 1.
�. Hale, "Bargaining, Du= and Economic Liberty" (1943), 43 Columbia LR.
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subsequent cases which allow states to refuse Medicare to women
who seek an abortion for other than therapeutic reasons.45 Con
sequently, the very people who may decide to have an abortion, in
cluding economically deprived women who agree to carry a child for
a fee, are financially incapable of obtaining a legal abortion and are
therefore economically compelled to go to term or else risk (their
lives in) an illegal abortion. Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that a
court would compel Mr. Stern, or another surrogate father, to pay for
such an abortion. Hence, this father-like concession is not a real
choice if Sorkow J. would only take judicial notice of the very likely
fact that it is only the economically deprived in the first place who
would want to become birth mothers.46
Additionally, the Stems undertook a risk. It appears to be a
norm within the industry that the fathers and social parents are cau
tioned that the mother may change her mind and keep the child.47 It
is unclear whether such information was communicated in the present
case, despite the fact that there is ample evidence (at p. 1142) that
the agency knew of Mrs. Whitehead's propensity to change her mind.
Thus, if free market ideology is to be the name of the game, caveat
emptor, Jet the buyer beware. Again an implied term could easily
have been introduced to take this into account.48
A further, obvious, possibility that Sorkow J. does not deal with
adequately is that the contract could be void as contrary to public
policy. Historically, the courts have been reluctant to make decisions
on this basis, as it is too blatant a method of revealing their own so
cial, political and economic preferences. However, this case was al
ready publicly recognized as one necessitating political preferences, so
the judge may have been well advised to grasp the nettle and at
45
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Indeed, in
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct 2671, 65 L Ed. 2d 784 (1980), the

Supreme Court held that state funding for an abortion could be refused even if the
woman's doctor determined that an abortion was necessary in order to safeguard her
health.
46.ibis comment does not deal with the constitutional ramifications of the case.
However, it is worth mentioning that the reference to Roe v. Wade raises another dif
ficult constitutional problem for disadvantaged groups. The triumphs of the women's
movement in Roe v. Wade; Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1977); Griswold v. Conn, 381 U.S. 479 (1975), were
all based upon the individualistic predilection for privacy. Now privacy is bemg ad
vocated as the basis of women's constitutional right to reproductive self-determination:
.
see Sly, ante, footnote 7, and Keane, ante, footnote 7.
47Eaton, ante; footnote 7, p. 711; K.M. Brophy, "Surrogate Mother Contract to
Bear a Child" (1982), 20 J. Fam. Law 263, p. 264.
481be Stems could have sued I.C.N.Y. on the basis of professional negligence,
thereby avoiding the convoluted agency argument
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least be candid about the competing policy preferences. Such an ar
gument would not have lacked relevant precedent. In Eng]and, for
example, the Warnock Committee proposed that surrogacy was con
trary to public policy on the basis that it became perilously close to
baby-selling.49 Moreover, in the · Eng]ish case of A v. C. (1978), 8
Fam. Law 170, Comyn J. held that a contract between a man and a
prostitute by which she agreed to become pregnant and surrender the
child on birth was unenforceable because it was a pernicious selling
of the child. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision ([1985) F.L.R.
445 at 458) and went even further by denying him access.50
More persuasive and analogous still is the existence in 24
American states of "baby-buying laws" which explicitly bar the pay
ment of a fee to the mother in connection with the adoption of her
child.51 The relevant New Jersey legislation provides that:
No person . . . shall make, offer to make, or assist or participate in
any placement for adoption and in connection therewith (1) pay, give or
agree to give any money or any valuable consideration . . . or (2) take,
receive, acce�t or agree to accept any money or any valuable
2
consideration,

and imposes a criminal sanction,53 thereby rendering any contracts to
the contraxy unenforceable.
Sorkow J.'s response to such provts1ons is unconvincing and nar
rowly legalistic. He argues that surrogacy was not in the contempla
tion of the legislators when the adoption legislation was drafted, and
that because it is a criminal statute it should be construed narrowly.
But of course there are canons of statutoxy interpretation to the con
traxy: that we should follow the spirit, not the letter of the legislation;
that the quest for legislative intent . is misconceived; and that the issue
in the present case is not the imposition of a penal sanction, but
simply the non-enforceability of a contract that is void as contraxy to
the public policy against baby-farming. Indeed, in several other states
the attorneys general had issued advisoxy opinions which proposed
49Ante, footnote 7, paras. 8.4 and 8.5.
50eut see, contra, Re A Baby, Times, Fam. Div., Latey J., 15th January 1985.
51L. Andrews, "The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproductive
Technologies" (1984), 70 AB.AJ., 5th August, pp. 54-55; Katz, ante, footnote 7, p. 8.
Similar provisions exist in England, see ante, footnote 38, Adoption Act, s. 50, and in
Nova Scotia, Children's Services Act, S.N.S. 1976, c. 8, s. 14(3). See also Ont. L.R.C.,
vol. 1, p. 92.
52N.J. Stat. Ann., para. 9:3-54 (West Supp., 1985).
531bid., para. 9:3-54(2)c: "Any person, firm, partnership corporation, association or
agency viofating this section shall be guilty of a high misdemeanour".
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that similar legislation should apply to "commercial"
arrangements.54

surrogacy

Furthermore, there was precedential case law which posits that,
independent of any statutes, any payment in connection with adoption
is unenforceable because it is contrary to public policy.55 Such case
law and legislation are simply more specific examples of a more
general, post-slavery principle that humans are not property and
therefore cannot be sold. The decision is curiously silent on such
issues, favouring instead a niore technical, narrow approach.
Moreover, there was a conspicuous failure to discuss several
recent cases from other states which may have helped to shed some
light on the issues. For example, in Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich.
App. 506, 333 N.W. 2d 90 (1983), varied 420 Mich. App. 367, 362
N.W. 2d 211, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that its Paternity
Act made it illegal to pay a "surrogate". However, in Sun-ogate
Parenting Assoc. v. Kentucky ex rel Armstrong, 704 S.W. 2d 209 (1986),
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that its version of the baby-selling
laws did "not apply to surrogacy arrangements". The decision not to
refer to these precedents is just as revealing as any decision to refer
to them.
Rather than confronting the difficult value choices that such a
discussion would necessitate, Sorkow J. sought refuge in a spurious
distinction. He proposes (at p. 1157) that it is possible to distinguish
between "baby selling" and "baby sitting", for the latter is merely the
provision of a ser vice and the price paid is for the service, not the
child.56 This . is exactly the distinction made b the leading
7 The repercusentrepreneur of contracts for babies, Mr. Noel Keane.17
54Ky: Op. Att\, Gen. 81-18 (1981); Ohio Op. Att'y Gen. 83-001 (1983); Okla. Op.
Att'y Gen. 83-162 (1983). The Attorney General of Louisiana reached a similar con
clus1on in an informal letter. But see Katz, ante, footnote 7, at pp. 18-25, who argues
that there are relevant distinctions between baby-selling and "surrogacy arrangements".
Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, 185 S.E. 2d 387 (1971); W,Iley v. lAwton, 8 Ill.
Ap_p. 2d 344, 132 N.E. 2d 35 (1956); Doe v. Kelly, (1981), 6 Fam. LR. (B.N.A.) 3011,
affirmed 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.�. 2d 438, ce:t, denied 459 U.S. 1183 (U.S.); Re
R.KS., 10 Fam. L.R. (B.NA) (1983), Re Baby Girl, 9 Fam. L.R:. (B.N.A.) 2348, but
see also In re Estate of Shirk, 186 Kan. 311, 350 P. 2d 1 (196o). See also the
Canadian case Reid (Gray) v. Gray (1976), 29 R.F.L 63 (B.C.S.C).
56sorkow J. does not explicitly use these terms, although he clear)y accepts such a
conceptual dichotomization. See further Slv, ante, footnote 7, p. 53. Ile reinforces this
point by adding that the child is already Mr. Stem's, and that he cannot buy what is
his own. This reference to a proprietary interest in the child is disconcerting. For a
fascinating feminist deconstruction of ''property" and its co_gnates "proper" and
"propriety" see Luce Irigaray, This Sex Wbicli Is Not One (1985) trans.
57Keane, ante, footnote 7, p. 157; see also Sly, ante, footnote 7, p. 53.
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sions of such a distinction are frightening, for it reduces a woman to
an object, an "ambulatory incubator", a vehicle for "uterus rental". It
fails to recognize the dignity of women as persons.
A further possibility that would allow the court to hold the con
tract void as contrary to public policy is to analogize with prostitution
contracts.
When we turn to the question of remedies the decision goes
from bad to worse. The nonnal remedy for breach of contract is
damages, which, if applied to this case, would mean that the
Whiteheads would have had to repay the money but retain custody of
the child. Indeed, if the contract was of the same nature as most
such contracts, payment would be by escrow account, with the con
sequence that the capital would have remained unpaid, although ex
penses would have been covered.58 But the court hastily turned to
the discretionary, equitable remedy of specific performance, without
really justifying why damages were not adequate. Apart from the fac
tor of intense disappointment, damages could have put Mr. Stern
back in his original position; he could have donated sperm to a dif
ferent woman and perhaps gained a child within a year. In addition,
Sorkow J. could have awarded expectancy damages to take account of
the disappointment factor. He did not do this for the very simple
reason - monetary awards are unsuitable remedies because, as even
the advocates of contracts for babies admit,59 it is only poor women
who will be in such a position! Instead, through the remedy of
specific performance, traditionally conceived as benefiting the weaker
party, Baby M. was ripped away from her mother. Moreover, there is
a strong line of cases which posit that specific performance will not
be ordered for a contract of personal services.6Cl Finally, specific per
formance is only available if the claimants come with "clean hands";
in this · case there was some doubt about the honesty of the Sterns
because they had falsely claimed that Mrs. Stern was "infertile", when
in fact she suffered from a mild form of multiple sclerosis, which is

8Kau,

5
ante, footnote 1; p. 21. The procedural history of this case seems to con
firm that the $10,000 had not yet been paid (see p. 1136).
59Keane, ante, footnote 7, p. 167.
<>Din England see Rigby v. Connel {1880), 14 Ch. D. 482, per Jessel M.R. In
Canada see Emerald Resources Ltd. v. Sterlin&. Oil Properties Mgmt. Ltd. (1969), 3
D.L.R (3d) 630 at 647, affirmed 15 D.LR (3d) 256 (S.C.C.) (Alta.]. In U.S. see
lsofox, Inc. v. U.S. 510 F. 2d 1369 at 1375; Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 111 Md. 248, 8
A 2d 639 (1939). See also P. Singer and D. Wells, The Reproduction Revolution
(1984), p. 122.
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qualitatively different. But this is suitably ignored at this point.61
Even more interesting is the fact that the decision to order
specific performance runs contrary to what has become known as the
"tender years presumption", that it is in the best interests of a young
child to be placed in the custody of her mother. Although this is by
no means determinative, empirical research suggests that it is still the
norm.62
The foregoing discussion of the question of law demonstrates
that contractual analysis is manifestly unsuited to the nature of the
problem, yet Sorkow J. has chosen these as the terms of discourse:
offer and acceptance, expectation and reliance, consideration and
breach, damages and specific performance. However, even if we were
to accept such a conceptualization, that does not necessitate the con
clusion which he reaches. The silences in his decision are deafening
and the gaps pervasive. The indeterminacy and malleability of con
tract law, supplemented by potentially relevant adoption statutes, per
mitted Sorkow J. a wide spectrum of choice, which he deliberately ig
nored.
The whole analysis on the basis of contract law is pitched at an
extremely high level of abstraction. There is no discussion of these
persons in their social, economic and political context on the level of
law. Of course there is on the level of fact, and that contextualism
very quickly eradicates any possibilities that the Whiteheads will be
given custody of the child. But then the court very quickly reverses it
self and speaks with the "forked tongue"63 of legal formalism, thereby
denying the parties their real economic position by espousing a free
market exchange version of contract law. Discussion at this level con
centrates on unsituated monads. It lacks any serious discussion of
who the parties are, or what their motivating factors might be.
But, in spite of himself, Sorkow J. is unable to maintain the
61Tue issue of infertility is discussed at length in the case, but under the rubric of
fraud. However, the judge adopted a rather unpersuasive argument based on his
preference for a broad interpretation of the word "infertility" so as to include
"medical risks". My point is 111 relation to the eqt1itable remedy which necessitates
that there be no doubt about the parties' honesty. The fact that Sorkow J. spent so
much effon clarifying this point suggests that there was in fact substantial doubt on
this issue.
62Weitzman and Dixon, "Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical
Patterns for Child Custody, Suppon and Visitation After Divorce" (1979), 12 U.C.
Davies L Rev. 473, pp. 501-505.
63Karl Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism" (1931), 44 H111Vard LR. 1222, p.
1252.
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pretence of contractual neutrality, to mask his own predisposition, for
he goes on to add (at p. 1166):
It is suggested that Mrs. Whitehead wanted a baby, now that she is
older than when her first two children were born, to experience and fulfil
herself again as a woman. She found the opportunity in a newspaper ad
vertisement She received her fulfillment. Mr. Stem did not.

The comment reveals a deep structural presupposition about Mrs.
Whitehead, and perhaps all women. It says flatly that a woman is
considered a babymaker, a machine for producing babies, that she
needed to have this child to affirm her continued identity as a
woman, to fulfil herself. But he then goes on to assume that once
she had the child, that was the satiation of her needs. Her babymak
ing role ceases as soon as she gives birth to the child and her iden
tity as a mother is terminated. This position ignores completely the
whole nature of the reproductive process, a process of bonding, inter
connection and interdependence. Only a male-identified judge, totally
insensitive to the process of what it means to be a mother, could
make such a statement.
One should not be surprised at any of this because, within just ,
one paragraph of this misogynistic statement, the judge proceeds to
eulogize the following statement of the guardian ad !item:
. . . "the child's best interests is the only aspect of man's law that must
be applied in fashioning a remedy for this contract . . . for any contract
that deals with the children of our society . . ."

Sorkow J. endorses this statement wholeheartedly but in doing so he
reveals his own political perspective. The reference to "man's Jaw" is
not accidental. It is men who have economic superiority in our
society, and it is men who determine what is in the best interest of a
child, or at least it is men's value structures that underpin the deter
mination. It is a male judge who identifies with other men in saying
that we want this child to go to the party who can be perceived to
be the cJassic, all-American family. It is, indeed, only a man's law
that can be so insensitive to the interests of women.
Conclusion

Situations such as Baby M. are cJassically hard cases. There is no
obvious, · or even persuasive, JegaJ right answer to what is dearly a so
cial, economic, poJitical and, most importantly, human problem. This
necessarily brief comment has no pretensions to resolving the issues
raised by such a case.
Rather, it attempts to raise both our conscience and our con
sciousness. The problems raised by biotechnology are e�ormous, many
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are perhaps as yet unrealized, and their resolution far off, if even
possible. Any legal response must carefully balance the various ad
vantages and disadvantages for all the parties involved, and society in
general. It must be sensitive to both individual freedom and social
responsibilities, self-interest and altruism, the social and economic in
equalities inter and intra genders. It requires analysis, reflection and
evaluation that is contextual and specific, not abstract and unidimen
sional.
The decision of Sorkow J. fails to live up to such (admittedly)
high standards. The problem is that he' faiJs to even come close;
indeed, be faiJs to even try. The result is that he ignores completely
the perspective of some of those who will be affected most directly
by the practice of contracts for babies, the mothers. More than this,
Sorkow J. goes beyond ignorance to outright assault on the dignity of
such persons, by wallowing in his own legalistic, masculinist arrogance.
He endorses a double-disciplining of Mrs. Whitehead, first, through
bis contribution to character assassination by the mental health
professionals and, second, by his support for the exploitive imperative
of commutative justice.
No doubt, with hindsight, people wiJI say that Sorkow J. was cor
rect, now that Mrs. Whitehead and her husband have separated - he
made the correct decision in granting custody to the Stems. However,
this is a chicken and egg situation. Was the failure of the Whitehead
famiJy to maintain custody of the child the cause of the breakdown
or the effect? We do not know. The simple fact that the Whiteheads
are no longer together does not mean that Sorkow J. was right;
rather it might mean that, due to the pressure which this situation
imposed upon them, not only did the decision "terminate and sever"
Mrs. Whitehead's relationship with her chiJd, it also undermined her
relationship with her spouse. Law can be extremely destructive of in
terpersonal relationships.
Moreover, now that the case is on appeal (15th September 1987,
New Yor:k Times), the fact that she is now a single parent should
not be utilized to confirm that it is in the best interests of the child
to be placed with a married couple. Single parents are good parents;
presumptions to the contrary are discriminatory and vindictive.
The decision of Sorkow J. does nothing to deter contemporary
North American society from sleepwalking into the dark night of an
Atwoodian reproductive dystopia - indeed it might even hasten it.

